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Executive Summary
The UN is increasingly deploying peacekeepers to
conflict theaters where there is no political
agreement and little or no peace to keep. Such
high-risk environments make it harder for the UN
to keep its personnel safe, fit, and healthy. While
current UN missions have adopted a number of
measures to mitigate these dangers, these develop-
ments do not address the systemic challenges
facing medical support to UN peace operations.
Therefore, this paper asks the question: What are
the challenges to providing medical support to UN
peace operations in high-risk environments?
The purpose of medical support for peace
operations is “to secure the health and well-being
of members of United Nations [peacekeeping
operations] in a timely and efficient manner.”1 At
UN headquarters, this is managed by two central
bodies: (1) the Medical Support Section (MSS),
which oversees medical logistics for peace
operations; and (2) the Medical Services Division
(MSD), which oversees medical support across the
UN system. However, both units have come to
focus on peace operations, resulting in replication
of work and a lack of clarity in planning and
coordination. With an increase in the number of
integrated missions, similar issues have arisen in
the field between the military and civilian
components of medical support.
As the landscape of peace operations continues
to evolve, a number of initiatives have aimed to
change UN medical support policies. Both the
report of the High-Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the secretary-
general’s follow-up report highlighted the need for
a coherent policy, leading to efforts to develop a
medical performance framework for UN peace
operations. Despite such initiatives, the UN needs
to address five core challenges in order to meet its
duty to care for its personnel in high-risk environ-
ments:
• Medical structures, planning, and coordination
in UN headquarters: Both MSS and MSD suffer
from lack of clarity in lines of authority and
inadequate planning, and there is insufficient
coordination between the two units.
• Standards of care: Although in theory the UN
guarantees the same standards of care to all
personnel, it has no way to enforce these
standards. As a result, many countries contribute
low-quality medical personnel and equipment,
and countries that can afford to often bypass UN
medical support systems, fostering resentment.
• Coordination in the field: Overly restrictive
procedures, especially regarding casualty evacua-
tion (CasEvac) and medical evacuation
(MedEvac) often prevent effective coordination
of medical support.
• Training and capacity building: Although all
UN personnel are supposed to receive pre-
deployment medical training, including in basic
first aid, levels of training vary from contingent
to contingent.
• Resources and capabilities: UN missions are
often forced to accept whatever equipment they
can get, resulting in serious capability gaps,
especially in terms of air assets.
Based on these challenges, the UN and its
member states could take a number of actions to
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of medical
support to peace operations in high-risk environ-
ments:
• MSD and MSS should coordinate better and
create links with the Office of Military Affairs
(OMA).
• Medical support planning should be included in
every aspect of mission planning and be tailored
to the context.
• Missions should shift away from Level II
hospitals, which are expensive and underutilized,
instead exploring alternatives such as mobile
medical units with surgical capabilities.
• Missions should focus on in-mission training,
including by improving mentoring of medical
personnel.
• MedEvac and CasEvac procedures should be
simplified, decentralized, and made more
flexible.
• The UN should seek pledges of medical
equipment and personnel from member states in
a more targeted way.
1 UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS), Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
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Introduction
On May 28, 2015, the force commander and police
commander of the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA) suffered an attack while conducting a
visit to contingents in Ber, about sixty kilometers
east of Timbuktu. The operation was kept top
secret to ensure security. Nonetheless, on the route
back the convoy was hit by an improvised explosive
device (IED) and the lead vehicle was destroyed,
resulting in the injury of a significant number of
troops and the destruction of equipment. The high-
level commanders were able to control the
situation on the ground and immediately requested
a helicopter for casualty evacuation (CasEvac) to
Bamako.
The commanders requested the helicopter to get
the convoy moving again quickly and to get those
who were injured to the hospital as soon as
possible. Considering the IED had been placed
while the convoy was in Ber, there was considerable
risk of a second attack or ambush, making it
imperative to keep moving. There was no
helicopter in Timbuktu at the time, but a helicopter
en route back to Timbuktu from Kidal was flying
directly over the attack site and would land back in
Timbuktu in sixty minutes. Despite the proximity
of an air asset, the request for CasEvac was denied,
as the distance between the attack location and
Timbuktu was said to be close enough to drive, and
the injuries were not considered life-threatening.
After seeing the empty helicopter fly directly over
the attack site, the convoy called for an armed
escort to the hospital, thus putting more troops in
harm’s way. It took sixty to ninety minutes longer
for the injured to reach the hospital than it would
have by helicopter. Luckily, no one died in the
process.2
Such direct attacks on UN camps and convoys,
seen most recently in Mali in Gao, Timbuktu, and
Kidal, are an indication of the changing nature of
conflict and the violent situations peacekeepers
find themselves in (see Box 1). As a result, more
peacekeepers are being killed in the field. In 2015,
129 military personnel, police, and civilians
posthumously received the Dag Hammarskjöld
Medal, awarded to those who lose their lives while
in the service of the UN.3 This generated concern
from various UN member states, as well as from
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The report of the
secretary-general on the implementation of the
recommendations of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations in December 2014 raised
the concern that UN peacekeeping has become
increasingly dangerous. UN peacekeepers are
increasingly the targets of carjacking, kidnapping,
and ambushes, and more are getting injured or
killed by IEDs, suicide bombings, rocket-propelled
grenades, helicopter crashes, artillery fire, and
landmines.4
These new environments, where the UN sends
peacekeepers without being able to guarantee their
safety, challenge the foundational assumptions and
doctrine of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are
increasingly losing their impartiality and deploying
to conflict theaters where there is no political
agreement and little or no peace to keep. These
missions are commonly known as “stabilization”
missions, a term that the UN has not defined.
Stabilization missions “operate in the midst of on-
going conflicts”5 and therefore may have to
maintain a cease-fire or support a peace process
rather than support the implementation of a peace
agreement.6
This incident in MINUSMA also demonstrates
the challenge of keeping peacekeeping personnel
safe, fit, and healthy, particularly in such difficult
and dangerous environments. Some measures
current UN missions have adopted to mitigate
these dangers include: having liaison officers or
language assistants from government forces or
armed groups accompany patrols; coordinating
with and getting approval from relevant host-
2 Interview with Col. Peter Öberg, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, 2017.
3 “Peacekeeping ‘Flagship of the UN Enterprise,’ Ban Says ahead of Day Honouring ‘Blue Helmets,’” UN News Centre, May 19, 2016, available at
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53976#.WOemn2e1uUl .
4 UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.
A/69/642, December 9, 2014.
5 Cedric de Coning, “Do We Need a UN Stabilization Doctrine?” in What Needs to Change in UN Peace Operations? An Expert Briefing Book Prepared for the High-Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, edited by Richard Gowan and Adam C. Smith (New York: Center on International Cooperation and International Peace
Institute, 2014).
6 Arthur Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali?” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4, no. 1 (2015).
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country authorities early on; putting in place
fortified defenses and conducting domination
patrols around the outer perimeters of camps;
liaising with local security agencies to provide
additional protection and information; and
increasing the number of armored vehicles for UN
police patrolling high-risk areas. In addition,
MINUSMA and the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic (MINUSCA) both regularly
equip their camps with overhead bunkers, trenches
inside the camps, personal protective equipment
against indirect fire, and radar to detect incoming
mortars and rockets.8
However, these developments do not address the
systemic challenges facing medical support to UN
peace operations, including the need for more
paramedics trained in pre-hospital trauma life
support, greater capacity for casualty evacuation
(CasEvac) and medical evacuation (MedEvac), and
more trauma-level hospitals.9
Previous reports from the International Peace
Institute have focused on health and illness in UN
peace operations. Sara Davies and Simon Rushton
have explored the complex relationship between
UN peacekeeping and health. They find a need for
greater attention to conducting medical checks and
providing healthcare for peacekeepers both before
and during deployment. They also shed light on the
dilemmas raised by peacekeepers delivering health
assistance, which is sometimes used to “win hearts
and minds” but often is not in line with UN
mandates or coordinated with humanitarian
agencies.10 In another report, Marina Henke argues
that illness is still the prevalent cause of fatalities in
UN peace operations and that illness-related fatali-
ties are on the rise.11
Research by Haidi Wilmot, Scott Sheeran, and
Lisa Sharland has focused on confronting the safety
and security challenges facing peace operations.
Among other things, their report recommends
ensuring that all peace operations have adequate
medical support and evacuation capabilities,
establishing a surge of security and medical
personnel at mission start-up and during crises,
and considering private service providers when
rapidly deploying medical support.12
Rather than focusing just on health or safety, this
paper looks at the challenges of medical support to
peace operations in high-risk environments. It is
7    UN Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division and Office of Military Affairs (OMA), briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,
November 22, 2016.
8     UN PET Division and OMA, briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, November 22, 2016.
9     Interview with Jillann Farmer, Director of MSD, 2017.
10  Sara E. Davies and Simon Rushton, “Healing or Harming? United Nations Peacekeeping and Health,” New York: International Peace Institute, March 2015,
available at www.ipinst.org/2015/03/healing-or-harming-united-nations-peacekeeping-and-health .
11  Marina E. Henke, “Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities,” New York: International Peace Institute, December 2016,
available at www.ipinst.org/2016/12/has-un-peacekeeping-become-more-deadly-analyzing-trends-in-un-fatalities .
12  Haidi Wilmot, Scott Sheeran, and Lisa Sharland, “Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations,” International Peace Institute, July 2015, available at
www.ipinst.org/2015/07/safety-and-security-challenges-in-un-peace-operations .
Box 1. Changing conflict environments7
The new conflict environments facing UN peace operations can have a number of characteristics, including
an increase in:
• Lack of freedom of movement for UN peacekeepers, despite status of forces agreements granting this right
(UNMISS, UNAMID, UNIFIL);
• Sophisticated and well-coordinated IED attacks by terrorists, causing more casualties and damage
(MINUSMA);
• Indirect attacks on UN installations by mortar, artillery, and rocket (UNMISS, MINUSCA, MINUSMA);
• Direct attacks on UN patrols and convoys (MINUSMA, MINUSCA);
• Violent demonstrations against UN troops (UNMISS, MONUSCO, MINUSCA); and
• Attacks on camps for internally displaced persons and protection-of-civilian sites by government forces or
armed groups, causing death and injury of civilians (UNMISS, UNAMID, MINUSCA).
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13  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
14  Ibid.
15  Interview with Jillann Farmer.
16  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
concerned with the growing risk that troops, police,
and civilians face when deployed to high-risk
environments. While illness and accidents will
remain a prevalent cause of fatalities in UN peace
operations, medical facilities need to adapt to the
operational realities of high-risk, asymmetric-
threat environments where peacekeepers are the
direct target of attacks.
The central question this paper asks is: What are
the challenges to providing medical support to UN
peace operations in high-risk environments? In
answering this question, the paper draws on
interviews the authors conducted in New York,
Oslo, Bangui, Bamako, and Gao with more than
fifty experts working on medical support, planning,
command and control, MedEvac and CasEvac, and
other areas intrinsic to healthcare, safety, and
security in peace operations, especially in high-risk
environments. The authors conducted field
research in Mali and the Central African Republic,
visiting contingents and field hospitals in the UN
missions in both countries. The paper also draws
on insights from past research, evaluations, and
reports on medical challenges in peace operations.
Structures for Medical
Support to UN Peace
Operations
The purpose of medical support for peace
operations is “to secure the health and well-being
of members of United Nations [peacekeeping
operations] in a timely and efficient manner.”13 The
medical aspects of a UN mission’s work fall into
two categories: (1) providing medical support to
mission personnel under the command of a chief
medical officer, who oversees the provision of
medical care in the mission hospital or clinic and
oversees the care provided to troops, police, and
civilian personnel; and (2) ensuring the health of
peacekeepers and civilian personnel prior to their
deployment in the mission.14
MEDICAL SUPPORT STRUCTURES IN
HEADQUARTERS
Medical support for UN peace operations is
managed by two central bodies in New York: (1)
the Medical Support Section (MSS) of the
Department of Field Support; and (2) the Medical
Services Division (MSD) of the Department of
Management. MSD oversees medical support
across the UN system, while MSS oversees medical
logistics for peace operations. However, as
peacekeeping has evolved to become an increas-
ingly core function of the UN, both MSS and MSD
have come to focus on peace operations, resulting
in replication of work and a lack of clarity in
planning and coordination.15
In theory, the roles and functions of both medical
divisions are clear. The Medical Support Manual
for United Nations Field Missions lays out the
divisions between the two departments (see Figure
1). MSD, under the Department of Management, is
responsible for medical policymaking and
standards for UN subsidiary organs. This involves
formulating and reviewing UN medical standards,
policies, and guidelines; ensuring coordination and
monitoring of system-wide implementation; and
providing professional and technical oversight to
medical personnel in the missions, including
credentialing UN medical personnel.16
MSS, seated in the Department of Field Support,
is responsible for facilitating medical operational
and logistical activities in UN field missions (both
peacekeeping operations and special political
missions). This involves developing the medical
support component of mission concepts of
operations and support plans; developing and
reviewing the medical component of issue papers
the Secretariat submits to the General Assembly’s
Contingent-Owned Equipment Working Group
and reviewing the medical component of the UN
manual on contingent-owned equipment;
supporting planning and execution of medical
logistics and procurement; and coordinating the
medical aspects of projects to identify and rectify
shortfalls in the capacities and capabilities of
medical support deployed by troop- and police-
contributing countries.17
MSD and MSS work together in a number of
areas. MSD works with MSS in planning integrated
missions, which have become more common as
peace operations face increasingly high-risk
environments. MSS, as part of the mission teams of
the Departments of Field Support and
Peacekeeping Operations, participates in pre-
deployment visits, and MSD conducts advisory and
assessment visits to countries that have pledged
equipment to missions to ensure standards are met;
sometimes these missions are conducted jointly or
simultaneously.18 The two departments also work
together to ensure military and police units are
trained and other personnel are effective and up-
to-date.19
However, as UN peace operations are increas-
ingly deployed to high-risk environments, the
division of roles and responsibilities between MSD
and MSS has become more complicated. To ensure
that all those involved prioritize medical support in
every aspect of mission planning, UN personnel
working on medical issues need to coordinate
better. Further, drawing on the High-Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ (HIPPO)
recommendation for more tailored peace
operations, there is a need to make missions more
flexible and better able to adapt to emergencies in
the field.20
MEDICAL SUPPORT STRUCTURES IN
FIELD MISSIONS
In a multidimensional peace operation, medical
support is usually provided by both the civilian and
the military/police components of the mission (see
Figure 2). The chief medical officer is responsible
for the overall civilian medical support operations
in a field mission. The chief medical officer reports
directly to the director of mission support or chief
of mission support for operational matters,
including issues related to life-threatening
emergencies and MedEvac.21 The military compo -
  MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE OPERATIONS                                                                                                           5
17  Ibid.
18  Interview with Jillann Farmer; UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
19  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
20  United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,
June 16, 2015.
21  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
Figure 1. Medical support structure in headquarters
nent of medical support consists of the force
medical cell, which is headed by the force medical
officer. The force medical officer reports to the
force commander and is central to all issues related
to medical support for military personnel.22
As a result, the civilian and military structures for
medical support are separate. This has worked well
in the past when missions were either predomi-
nantly civilian or predominantly military.
However, in missions such as MINUSMA and
MINUSCA, which have large numbers of civilian
and military personnel placed together in high-risk
areas, these two streams have become more
intertwined, leading to replication of roles and
challenges related to authority. This highlights the
need for a more integrated system for communica-
tion between the force medical officer and the chief
medical officer.
To facilitate cooperation, the civilian and
military components of medical support are
supposed to be incorporated under the mission
medical cell to form a single office. Where possible,
the offices of the chief medical officer and force
medical officer are also supposed to be co-located
to maximize collaboration.23 However, this is not
always the case. In MINUSCA, for example, the
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22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
Figure 2. Medical support structure in integrated missions
chief medical officer is based in the log camp and
the force medical officer in the main camp. In
MINUSMA’s “super camp,” on the other hand, the
two officers are located in offices directly opposite
each other. MINUSMA has also created a seat for
its MedEvac coordinator in its Joint Operations
Centre to give this person a dedicated space during
times of emergency.24
Another example of a structure to coordinate
medical support is NATO’s Patient Evacuation
Coordination Cell in Afghanistan, which is a
permanent duty station in the Joint Operations
Centre and can be scaled up or down according to
threat levels. This cell was created because of the
challenging operating environment and the need
for innovative initiatives to improve coordination,
transfer of information, and reaction times.25While
the UN operates differently than NATO, if it is to
operate in high-risk environments it could consider
similar approaches to improve coordination.
Changing Medical Support
Policies
The 2015 HIPPO report made several recommen-
dations related to medical support, which were
seen to give much-needed momentum to efforts to
reform and to provide more resources to medical
support structures.26 The three main recommenda-
tions were to:
1. Establish a system “to enable Member States to
contribute short- or medium-term specialist
capabilities,” including for medical support;
2. Prioritize “timely and reliable medical evacua-
tion and casualty evacuation” in mission start-
ups and continuously maintain this
throughout the mission, including the
capability to fly at night, and not to assess any
mission “to have reached an initial operating
capability unless these arrangements are in
place”; and
3. Develop a medical performance framework,
“including through the introduction of
standards for the quality of care provided and
practitioner, hospital and medical evacuation
capabilities.”27
Many of these recommendations were repeated
in Secretary-General Ban’s follow-up report, in
which he urged a focus on “ensuring the safety and
security of United Nations personnel.”28 The
General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peace -
keeping Operations (C34) has also made significant
commitments to improve medical support on the
ground. It emphasized the need for “clear mini -
mum standards for all UN medical capabilities,” as
well as “clear capability standards [for CasEvac and
MedEvac] that ease the facilitation of rapid
responses, especially during life-or-death situa -
tions.” The committee further urged “the 
Secre tariat and troop- and police-contributing
countries to strengthen their efforts to harmonize
pre-deployment and in-country awareness 
pro grammes and to ensure the strict application of
United Nations guidelines on medical clearance
and medical conditions that preclude deploy-
ment.”29
These reports brought much-needed attention to
the challenges of medical support to UN peace
operations in high-risk environments and
highlighted the need for a coherent policy. The rise
of fatalities in MINUSMA also demonstrated the
need to make medical planning central to mission
planning, and this was clearly supported by UN
member states.
In response to these reports and high numbers of
fatalities in some missions, there have been signifi-
cant efforts to establish the foundations of a
medical performance framework for UN peace
operations, which will apply to all healthcare facili-
ties, both civilian and military.30 In addition, the
Medical Services Division (MSD) has developed an
initial plan to establish and manage the healthcare
standards for this framework.31 MSD, in partner-
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24  Interview with chief of the Joint Operations Centre in MINUSMA, 2017.
25  Mariah Best, “Medical Operations in Afghanistan: Continued Success as ANSF Takes the Lead,” Defense Video Imagery Distribution System, May 1, 2014,
available at www.dvidshub.net/news/119046/medical-operations-afghanistan-continued-success-ansf-takes-lead .
26  Interview with staff from the UN Medical Services Division (MSD), 2016.
27  United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace.
28  UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations, UN Doc. A/70/357–S/2015/682, September 2, 2015.
29  UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2016 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/70/19, 2016. 
30  Interview with staff from OMA, 2016.
31  Interview with staff from MSD, 2016.
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32  Ibid.
33  Interview with staff from MSD, 2016.
34  MSD, presentation to the field support seminar, IPI, February 16, 2017.
35  UN DPKO/DFS, UNMEM Manual: Selection, Deployment, Rotation, Extension, Transfer and Repatriation of United Nations Military Experts on Missions in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, December 2012; MSD, presentation to the field support seminar, IPI, February 16, 2017.
Box 2. Healthcare facilities in peacekeeping missions35
Level I: First line or “battalion level”
• Trained medical personnel (including a doctor), with support usually provided by organic medical
teams of the field units
• 69 (civilian) Level I or Level I+ clinics operated by the UN
• 293 Level I or Level I+ clinics operated by troop-/police-contributing countries
• 1 Level I+ hospital operated by the UN
Level II: Second line or “brigade/sector” level surgical facility
• Limited specialist expertise and limited surgical capabilities, including life-, limb-, and organ-saving
surgery
• 18 Level II hospitals operated by troop-/police-contributing countries
• 1 Level II+ hospital operated by troop-/police-contributing countries
• 1 Level II hospital operated by the UN
Level III: Third line “field hospital”
• Fully equipped and staffed multidisciplinary field hospital, with all major medical and surgical special-
ties provided for
• 2 Level III hospitals operated by troop-/police-contributing countries
ship with the Medical Support Section (MSS) and
the Office of Military Affairs, also identified several
work streams to evaluate and potentially reform:
• Buddy first-aid training;
• Training of first responders/trauma medics;
• CasEvac/MedEvac policy development and
implementation; and
• Standardization of Level I, Level II, and Level III
care (see Box 2).32
In line with these plans, MSD is developing a
standardized basic life-support curriculum and a
competency framework, which are being
implemented throughout the UN peacekeeping
system. The second stage of this project involves
developing and implementing a training-of-trainers
program to standardize training of peacekeeping
personnel across all troop- and police-contributing
countries. To standardize and improve the safety
and quality of treatment provided in Level II and III
hospitals, MSD is developing a United Nations
Manual for Healthcare Quality and Patient Safety
Standards, including an implementation guide and
associated tools.33
Linked to these efforts, and to ensure safe and
timely healthcare for UN personnel who rely on
UN-operated clinics and hospitals, the Department
of Management’s Office of Human Resources
Management has commenced a program to
improve oversight and governance of health
services. This program will work to improve
screening of the qualifications and experience of
personnel recruited to work in UN healthcare
facilities, establish a standards and accreditation
scheme for health operations, and provide
enhanced independent medical support to the
Board of Inquiry. The office will also support all
peace operations in implementing mission-specific
emergency response plans and ensuring compli-
ance with medical emergency and mass-casualty
incident management plans.34
In terms of CasEvac and MedEvac, MSD and
MSS are developing and promulgating a new policy
on evacuation procedures (see Box 3). The
currently endorsed 10-1-2 framework requires
access to advanced life support from medical
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professionals within one hour of injury (see Box 4).
This target cannot be met without equipment,
infrastructure, trained personnel, and the highest
levels of integrated teamwork throughout the
process.36 The new policy will aim to:
• Provide for the establishment, operation, and
governing of standardized CasEvac/MedEvac
procedures across UN peace operations;
• Define the critical and complex elements of
CasEvac as distinct from but aligned with
MedEvac in the end-to-end chain of care;
• Clearly define roles and responsibilities at
headquarters and in field missions; and
• Put in place standard operating procedures that
underpin the overarching policy.37
This policy is being drafted collaboratively by
relevant service officers from MSD, the Departments
of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support,
including the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the
Police Division, and the Logistics Support Division.
As of April 2017, the first draft has been finished and
has been circulated to missions for comment. The
paramount importance of this policy is regularly
demonstrated in field missions, which will each
develop standard operating procedures in line with
it. Some missions have already started this process.
The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
was the first, developing procedures that allowed the
force commander to deploy air assets during a
MedEvac emergency.38 MINUSMA also revised its
standard operating procedures to focus on
MedEvac.39
36  Ibid. 
37  OMA, MSD, and MSS, CasEvac/MedEvac Project: A Project to Develop and Implement Policy for CasEvac/MedEvac across UN Peace Operations, October 2016.
38  Interview with staff from MSS, 2016.
39  MINUSMA Standing Operating Procedures.
40  OMA, MSD, and MSS, CasEvac/MedEvac Project.
41  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
42  Col Homer Tien et al., “Advances in Damage Control Resuscitation and Surgery: Implications on the Organization of Future Military Field Forces,” Canadian
Journal of Surgery 58, no. 3 (2015).
Box 4. 10-1-2 principle
The Medical Support Manual defines the 10-1-2 principle as “ensuring access to skilled first aid within 10
minutes of the point of injury or the onset of symptoms; advanced life support as soon as possible, and no
later than 60 minutes; and access to limb- and life-saving surgery, no later than two hours.”41
The 10-1-2 principle is not unique to UN peacekeeping operations. In the Allied Command Operations
Directive 83-1 on Medical Support to Operations, the principle is defined as:
• Within 10 minutes of wounding: enhanced first aid (immediate lifesaving measures applied by
personnel trained in tactical combat casualty care, including bleeding and airway control for severely
injured casualties);
• Within 1 hour of wounding: damage-control resuscitation (initiated by emergency medical personnel);
and
• Within 2 hours of wounding: damage-control resuscitation (depending on the specific and individual
requirement, the aim is to be able to provide damage-control resuscitation within 1 hour but no later
than 2 hours of wounding).42
Box 3. Definition of CasEvac and MedEvac40
Casualty evacuation (CasEvac) is the transportation of a patient from the site of injury where only limited
treatment can be administered. Medical evacuation (MedEvac) is the transportation of a patient who has
been administered treatment by medical professionals to another medical facility, such as from a Level I to a
Level II hospital. The actual transportation can be conducted by air, sea, or land. CasEvac is the more
complex of the two processes to implement effectively, as it involves medical, aviation, and logistics elements
from civilian and military components and must be cognizant of environmental and operational dynamics.
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43  Interview with staff from MSD, 2016.
44  Nikolay Chulkov, Review of the Medical Service in the United Nations System, UN Joint Inspection Unit, 2011, available at www.unjiu.org/en/reports-
notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2011_1_English.pdf .
45  Interview with Jillann Farmer.
46  Interview with the chief medical officer of MINUSCA, 2017.
47  Mirjam Donath, “Malaria Is the Leading Killer in Central African Republic: Aid Group,” Reuters, July 24, 2014, available at 
www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-malaria-un-idUSKBN0FT2R020140724 .
In addition to the processes above, MSD has
launched a process to evaluate the skills and level of
care provided in contributing countries before
accepting their deployment of a hospital. This
process would not allow the deployment of
hospitals that fail to meet the standards established.
MSD has also started to campaign against countries
where there have been significant healthcare
challenges. For example, after an evaluation of
countries providing hospitals to the UN Mission in
the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), those not
meeting the standards were asked to leave the
country.43
Main Challenges
The above-mentioned initiatives are addressing
serious gaps in medical support in the field,
especially in terms of policy guidance on how to
adapt to high-risk environments. However, there
are still significant challenges to medical support to
peace operations. We have identified five core
challenges that the UN needs to address in order to
meet its duty to care for its personnel in high-risk
environments.
MEDICAL STRUCTURES, PLANNING,
AND COORDINATION IN UN
HEADQUARTERS
While the Medical Services Division (MSD) should
be considered a nucleus linked to all aspects of
medical support, there is a clear disconnect in its
lines of authority and accountability. The majority
of UN healthcare personnel that MSD oversees
(doctors, nurses, and paramedical personnel)
actually work for different organizations or in
different departments. For example, physicians
deployed to UN peace operations have contracts
with the Department of Field Support, while
physicians in UN dispensaries have contracts with
the UN Development Programme (UNDP). MSD
has no input into the budgets and work plans of
these organizations or departments and is not
involved in managing the performance of their
personnel. As a result, lines of supervision and
authority are often unclear. When doctors are
deployed to a UN mission, it should be clear that
they are under the authority and supervision of the
UN. Otherwise, it is difficult for MSD to exercise
authority over or hold accountable the personnel it
supervises.44
The Medical Support Section (MSS) suffers from
a similar problem, as it is composed of seconded
officers who often end their rotations around the
same time. This creates challenges of institutional
memory, transfer of responsibility, and stability in
planning.45
Furthermore, medical planning, which should be
an integral part of mission planning, has been
disregarded in the past. The best form of protection
is adequate planning to match resources and tasks.
Medical support should be seen as preventive,
aiming to keep the body intact and not exposed to
medical threats such as hostile action or tropical
diseases.46 However, it is often not viewed in this
way. For example, in the Central African Republic,
which has a high incidence of malaria, MINUSCA’s
hospitals are run by contingents not experienced
with the disease.47 Assets should be deployed in line
with needs, leading to more flexible, focused field
missions.
High-risk peace operations also require better
coordination. These operations have greater need
for the military and greater demand for logistical
support, making the roles of the Office of Military
Affairs and MSS vital. At the same time, there is a
need to update the UN’s policies and procedures on
medical support to meet the demands of high-risk
environments. Despite questions over who should
hold this responsibility, it ultimately falls to MSD,
whose role in peace operations has also grown.
Better coordination between MSD, MSS, and the
Office of Military Affairs is needed to ensure that
peacekeepers are healthy when deployed and
trained for the conditions on the ground. However,
the only common reporting line between MSD and
MSS is the secretary-general, creating a disconnect
between the departments. This has caused a
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50  Ibid.
bifurcation of the roles of MSD and MSS, leading to
different practices and guidelines in the same
mission. There is a need to prioritize direct
emergency care in high-risk missions, which
requires better coordination among all elements
involved, as well as a better understanding of
responsibilities.
STANDARDS OF CARE
Standards of care are a core pillar of modern
healthcare management. As the Medical Support
Manual stipulates, “medical support extended to
UN peacekeeping personnel must meet standards
that are acceptable to all participating nations, with
the aim of providing clinical outcomes comparable
to prevailing peacetime medical care.”48 This means
that UN personnel suffering the same injury in
Juba and in New York should have the same
medical outcome; if that injury is survivable, they
should survive regardless of where it occurs. Such
support requires a “high state of readiness and
availability, providing timely, responsive and
continuous care to any patient or casualty within
the medical system.”49 If standards of care are not
implemented, the quality of care delivered can be
seen as “luck of the draw.”
Despite this principle, the UN has no metrics to
assess the quality of medical personnel and
equipment provided by troop-contributing
countries and there is no requirement for reporting
errors. As a result, many countries contribute low-
quality personnel and equipment, forcing the UN
to outsource medical support (e.g., in the case of
MINUSMA, to a commercial aero medical evacua-
tion team), which is expensive and comes with its
own set of challenges. If troop-contributing
countries took it upon themselves to meet adequate
standards and the UN enforced these standards,
the process of providing medical support to peace
operations would be much smoother.
The Medical Services Division (MSD) is respon-
sible for setting medical standards for the UN and
conducting pre-deployment visits to ensure the
standards are implemented. Within a mission, the
chief medical officer sets up systems to verify safety
and hygiene standards for buildings and accommo-
dations. In collaboration with the chief medical
officer, the force medical officer ensures that
medical facilities adhere to these standards and that
uniformed peacekeepers being deployed to remote
locations receive regular first-aid training. The
Level I medical unit commander and the Level II
and III hospital commanders are responsible for
ensuring medical services provided by the unit
meet the standards for self-sustainment set out in
the UN manual for contingent-owned equipment.50
Hospitals in UN peacekeeping missions are
pledged by member states. In Mali, the Level I
hospital was provided by Togo and the Level II
hospital by Nigeria and China; the Level III
hospital is a preexisting hospital in Dakar, Senegal.
Chinese Level II field hospital in Gao, Mali. Egyptian Level I field hospital in Bangui, Central African
Republic.
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These hospitals are evaluated and pre-checked by
MSS during a pre-deployment visit and by MSD
during an assessment and advisory visit. Where
gaps are seen, MSS and MSD provide a list of
criteria to be filled.
There is, however, a disconnect between the
minimum standards set by the UN and the
implementation of these standards. This discon-
nect highlights the inability of both MSD and MSS
to monitor the implementation of all standards,
and there has been speculation that member states
are evaluated by different standards. This leads to
resentment among member states and a lack of
trust in, and dissatisfaction with, the UN’s ability to
guarantee quality healthcare. These challenges are
even greater in “deep field” locations.51 These areas
have limited access to medical facilities yet are most
in need of such assistance.
This failure to meet standards raises the issue of
whether there is a need for Level II hospitals in
high-risk peace operations. The cost of Level II
hospitals is very high and their utility quite low.
They are best-suited for large-scale battles like
those of World Wars I and II. It appears many are
left empty except when there are mass casualties,
and even then they only serve to stabilize patients
until they can be evacuated to a Level III hospital or
their home country.
The perceived low quality of Level II hospitals
creates an atmosphere of mistrust that is counter-
productive to any successful patient-provider
relationship.52 This results in efforts to bypass Level
II hospitals. Many European countries CasEvac or
MedEvac patients to a Level I or Level I+ hospital
and, when they are stable, MedEvac them to a
neighboring country or, if possible, to their home
country. Some even bring their own medical facili-
ties rather than using UN facilities. Arrangements
for care at facilities that are not integrated into the
mission’s medical support plan are made through
personal relationships and individual efforts. These
efforts do not provide systemic solutions and
undermine the entire UN medical support
operation.53
Consideration should be given to whether high-
risk operations should move away from the World
War II system of Level I, II, and III hospitals.
Instead, there could be more flexibility to deploy
Level I+ hospitals (e.g., rotational mobile medical
units with surgical capabilities) while improving
MedEvac. This ultimately connects to the need for
flexible and context-specific missions, where
hospitals and resources are deployed in line with
the needs on the ground. Regardless of the model,
all hospitals should meet the standards of all troop-
contributing countries. This could reduce the
desire to evacuate patients to home countries for
treatment, permit better use of resources, and
reduce tension among states.
Cultural and linguistic differences also contribute
to mistrust. It can be difficult for personnel to trust
medication they do not understand or medical
personnel they cannot communicate with. The UN
is a multinational organization with personnel from
all over the world. This can result, for example, in a
French-speaking soldier being evacuated by a
Dutch team to a Chinese hospital, which can work
as long as procedures and standards are in place.
However, without these, it can lead to confusion
and mistakes.
The fundamental challenge is that troop-
contributing countries do not meet the standards
set by the UN, and the UN is unable to hold them
accountable. When this happens, countries that
can afford it will use their own medical facilities, or
the UN will outsource to more expensive private
services to bridge the gap. This challenges the
authority of the UN in its medical support role.
COORDINATION IN THE FIELD
The term “command and control,” as defined by
the US military, encompasses “the exercise of
authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission.”54 Any large and
complex organization that operates in the field,
such as a UN peace operation, requires an effective
system for organizing and managing resources and
personnel. In recent years, discussions about
command and control have emphasized that
effective coordination among uniformed and non-
51  Expression originally used by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and that has now obtained widespread acceptance and usage within the UN system.
52  Interview with staff from MSD, 2016.
53  Chulkov, Review of the Medical Service in the United Nations System.
54  US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 2017, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf .
uniformed personnel is vital to a mission achieving
its goals and objectives. Coordination is especially
important when it comes to medical support.55
A challenge, however, is that the nature of the
chief medical officer and force medical officer
positions in missions does not always permit for
smooth communication, command, and control.
For example, MINUSCA does not have a dedicated
medical command structure. While attempting to
develop a more integrated strategy for responding
to alerts, the chief medical officer and force medical
officer operate from separate offices in Bangui—
the chief medical officer in the log camp and the
force medical officer in the main camp. The
resulting disconnect creates challenges when
emergencies erupt.56
In high-risk missions, there is a need to prioritize
an effective medical support plan to ensure that
there is an adequate communication and informa-
tion management system in place, that facilitates
CasEvac and MedEvac, emergency response, and
mass-casualty response.57 In order to ensure that
casualties survive in the event of attack, the
procedures for high-risk missions should be
organized, structured, and underpinned by a
practiced and fully understood command, control,
and coordination mechanism. To meet the 10-1-2
principle, these procedures should be supported by
well-trained operators and the necessary
equipment for transportation by air, road, or sea.
However, there have been cases where
procedures are too restrictive, resulting in ineffec-
tive evacuations. This has been a particular
challenge in tasking air assets in MedEvac and
CaseEvac situations. Currently, air assets are
authorized by the director of mission support.
However, there have been times when force
commanders believe they should have the power
to deploy air assets if military personnel have been
attacked. The central challenge is that there are a
limited number of helicopters and a limited
budget, and if helicopters are authorized where
there is less of a need, this could pose a risk if an
emergency arises. In addition, if a helicopter is
deployed when there is not an emergency, it wastes
flight hours, which are stipulated by the budget of
a mission.
There may be a need to refine communication
and reporting lines for deployment of air assets for
MedEvac and CasEvac in high-risk missions.
Missions could put in place a set of criteria,
including those related to the security situation and
types of injuries, for transferring authority for
deploying helicopters from the director of mission
support to the force commander. Moreover, the
Joint Operations Centre, chief medical officer, and
director of mission support could be jointly made
aware of incidents. This delegation of authority and
increased coordination would permit faster author-
ization of evacuations.
In addition, innovative approaches to informa-
tion sharing should be considered. In MINUSMA
the Joint Operations Centre has developed an
integrated information management system that is
used to share information and coordinate
processes. The Joint Operations Centre has a
database registering all MedEvacs and CasEvacs
and linking them to the incident registered in the
system. This database is accessible to all key
personnel involved, including those in the sectors,
as a way of ensuring information is shared and
personnel are up-to-date on what is happening.58
This system was developed in response to
increasing hostilities against the mission and the
need for integrated information sharing in order to
improve the effectiveness of evacuations. It has
been seen to reduce the response time.59 Such
innovative processes around the sharing of
information could also lead other missions to
respond more effectively in times of crisis.
TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING
Effective training is essential to addressing
challenges related to medical support on the
ground. Training of all personnel, including
medical personnel, is the responsibility of the
member state that deployed them. This training
takes place in accordance with requirements set out
at the national level and reflects criteria established
  MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR UN PEACE OPERATIONS                                                                                                         13
55  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
56  Interview with the chief medical officer of MINUSCA, 2017.
57  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
58  El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, presentation at the MINUSMA Joint Operations Centre headquarters, 2017.
59  Ibid.
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in the UN’s Medical Support Manual. This training
should involve pre-deployment training as well as
in-mission training. All personnel are supposed to
be deployed with basic first-aid training, while
medical personnel such as doctors and nurses are
supposed to be deployed with training in areas such
as trauma life support.60
However, levels of pre-deployment medical
training vary from contingent to contingent. This
becomes even more challenging in multinational
force with medical units and personnel from
different countries. Furthermore, over time these
skills deteriorate if not used. There is a vital need to
ensure that there is both thorough pre-deployment
training and regular in-mission training based on a
targeted training plan reflecting the needs of those
in the field. Fundamental to all training is ensuring
the maintenance and standardization of core skills
and procedures, with regular evaluations to ensure
skills are learned.61
Several forms of training are necessary for
personnel being deployed to missions, especially
those being deployed to high-risk environments.
The first stage of training, based on the 10-1-2
principle, is the “buddy system,” whereby in the
event a person is injured, his or her “buddy”
secures the wound within the vital first ten minutes
while assistance is on the way. This requires basic
first aid, and each peacekeeper is supposed to be
provided with an individual first-aid kit.
While contributing countries are responsible for
providing first-aid training, and this is supposed to
be verified before deployment, there has been
criticism that some contingents arrive to missions
lacking basic lifesaving skills.62 To address this
problem, the UN should focus on providing in-
mission first-aid training and trauma-bag training
during orientation. For example, the UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) has been working to
improve first-aid training in MINUSMA. While
MINUSMA’s contingents have bought into the
training, much more is still needed to standardize
their skill levels.63
In addition, not all peacekeepers have individual
first-aid kits because, it is said, they are not always
handed over during personnel rotations.64 The UN
needs to ensure that every peacekeeper has an
individual first-aid kit and to hold contributing
countries accountable if they do not. This should be
included in the Medical Support Section’s (MSS)
pre-deployment visits and in the Medical Services
Division’s (MSD) assessments of contingency-
owned equipment.
Peacekeeping personnel also need to be trained
on the “nine-liner” template (see Table 1). When
an incident takes place, they need to call it in with
the geographic coordinates and types of injuries to
permit the CasEvac and MedEvac procedure to
begin. However, the “nine-liner” template used to
do this is complex and requires training, which not
all contingents receive prior to deployment. This
must be included as part of the pre-deployment
training and addressed in orientation training to
ensure that contingents can provide basic informa-
tion to facilitate CasEvac and MedEvac.
After the ten minutes of support under the buddy
system, the next level of support needed under the
10-1-2 principle comes from first responders, who
stabilize the patient within one hour of wounding
during the evacuation. However, some mission
personnel, including some aeromedical evacuation
teams and medical personnel, are too poorly
trained to follow standard operating procedures.
This results in a discrepancy in the level of care that
UN personnel receive and explains why some
contingents are reluctant to engage in high-risk
operations.65
Moreover, many hospitals do not have capabili-
ties, and many doctors do not have the training, to
deal with mass-casualty events. Doctors trained in
their home country often do not know how to
operate in a high-risk zone. There is a need for
more trauma medics, paramedics, and doctors
trained to operate in challenging environments.
The UN should consider developing a medical
certification to ensure that doctors have the same
standard of qualifications. Currently, while MSD is
able to veto doctors put forward by contributing
60  UN DPKO/DFS, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions, 3rd edition, 2015.
61  Ibid.
62  US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, UN MedEvac/CasEvac Assessment, 2015.
63  Interview with staff from the UN Mine Action Service in MINUSMA, 2017. 
64  Ibid.
65  Contingent-Owned Equipment Working Group, “Outsourced Medical Operational Support and the Issue of Reimbursement,” France Issue Paper no. 1, 2017.
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A. No enemy in area
B. Possible enemy in area
C. Enemy in area
D. Hot pick-up zone (armed escort
required)













Line 9: Description of pick-up site and
terrain/obstacles 
countries, this veto can easily be overturned,
making it impossible to ensure quality standards.
Pre-deployment training and certification in
advanced trauma life support should be provided
to all medical contingents. Ideally, this would be
done at a training center and implemented by the
UN. However, there are limited resources for
training within the UN, so the onus would likely be
put on contributing countries.
As part of training, there should be an element of
capacity building. For example, in 2013 the US
African Deployment Partnership Training
(ADAPT) program conducted a training-of-
trainers for twenty-nine members of the Togolese
Armed Forces. This program trained participants
to train other soldiers as unit movement officers.66
Although this was not a UN program, the UN
should explore how it could implement similar
initiatives to develop partnerships around medical
training, especially since doctors sent to missions
are often underutilized.
One option could be to establish a center for pre-
deployment training closer to high-risk missions,
such as in Entebbe, Uganda. Alternatively, the UN
could use links with existing training centers in the
region. For example, the Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana conducts
pre-deployment training for African police officers
selected for deployment to multidimensional peace
operations in Darfur, Somalia, Mali, and Liberia.
Since 2009, it has trained more than 2,000 police
officers, about 581 of whom are women.67 These
examples of capacity building and collaboration
should initiate the process of establishing a system
whereby UN member states that are not able to
contribute troops assist in training the troops of
other countries.
The UN could also establish a mentorship
program whereby member states with greater
capacity in certain areas mentor those with less
experience. For example, multinational teams
could be put in place in medical establishments.
Medical directors with little operational experience
could also be mentored before being deployed.
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Table 1. Example of a generic air
MedEvac “nine-liner” template
RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES
Based on a recommendation in the HIPPO report,
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
created a Strategic Force Generation and Capability
Planning Cell in 2015. This cell was created in
tandem with other reforms recommended by
HIPPO, including replacing the old UN Standby
Arrangements System with the UN Peacekeeping
Capability Readiness System. The Strategic Force
Generation Cell’s central goal is to move the UN
away from a supply-based deployment system to
one that can anticipate and meet the demands of
effective field missions. The cell places particular
emphasis on generating key enablers such as
aviation and medical assets from member states.
These assets are essential not only for supporting
contingents deployed on the ground but also for
meeting the preconditions that certain contributing
countries request before providing troops.68
Currently, there is no publicized data specifically
on what the Strategic Force Generation and
Capability Planning Cell has generated, making it
difficult to determine the extent to which the cell
has been effective. What can be said, however, is
that the UN does not yet have the capacity to
choose the best equipment and resources from the
most “desirable” contributing countries and is still
accepting whatever it can get. This leads to
questionable capability standards within
peacekeeping forces and contributes to the inability
of missions to complete their mandates and to
guarantee the safety of personnel.69
Further, vast pledges of air assets from member
states at both the 2015 and 2016 peacekeeping
summits have not yet materialized (see Table 2).
The UN’s air assets are limited, and it is rare to find
helicopter units dedicated solely to CasEvac and
MedEvac. In MINUSCA, for example, there are no
dedicated medical helicopters, creating challenges
when the helicopter is being used for transporting
goods when a medical emergency arises.
Furthermore, not all of the mission’s helicopters
have combat or night-flying capabilities.
Western countries often complain about the
quality of equipment, but many are unwilling to
deploy further assets to the field. One approach to
address this challenge has been the agreement
among Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and
Sweden for a two-year rotation of military
transport aircraft deployed to MINUSMA. The
rotation will run until the end of 2018. The cooper-
ation will provide air transport services based on
Mission
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68  International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, “Institution- and Capacity-Building for Peace: Implications of the UN’s Review Panels’
Recommendations for Future Missions,” 2015, pp. 18–19, available at www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Challenges-Annual-Forum-
Report-2015.pdf ; Adam C. Smith, “European Military Capabilities and UN Peace Operations: Strengthening the Partnership,” International Peace Institute and
Center for International Peace Operations, October 2014, p. 4, available at 
www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Adam_Smith_October_2014_ENG.pdf ; UN Force Link,
“FAQ PCRS,” available at https://cc.unlb.org/Lists/FAQ/AllItems.aspx .
69  Ibid.
70  Data from UN DFS.
71  UNMISS has only two cargo aircraft.
MINUSCA               9                    2                   11
MINURSO               2                    0                    2
MINUSMA             17                  7                   24
MINUSTHA            5                    0                    5
MONUSCO            43                  7                   50
ONUCI                     5                    0                    5
UNAMA                   3                    0                    3
UNAMID                17                  0                   17
UNFICYP                3                    0                    3
UNIFIL                     7                    0                    7
UNMIL                     6                    0                    6
UNISFA                    4                    0                    4
UNMISS71                16                  0                   16
UNSOS                    10                  3                   13
Table 2. Helicopter providers
(March 2017)70
TotalAttackUtility
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six-month rotations. Norway’s rotation ended in
November 2016, with Portugal taking over, to be
followed by Denmark, Sweden, and finally
Belgium. Norway will sustain the camp facilities
and camp services in Bamako for the entire two-
year period. The rotation is a pilot project for the
UN as part of peacekeeping reform efforts. It can be
an example for other UN missions of how small
countries can cooperate and coordinate in joint
peacekeeping efforts.72
A similarly innovative approach could be a
mobile medical surgical unit deployed under a
rotational agreement. This Level I+ unit could be
quickly moved to where troops deploy. Under a
rotational scheme, it would be shared by a group of
countries that join together to provide the
resources to construct the hospital and rotate
personnel. While long-term permanent arrange-
ments are ideal, if these are not possible, such
schemes could be considered.
What is further needed is the means to hold
countries accountable for deploying substandard
equipment. Secretary-General António Guterres’s
recent move to withhold reimbursements from
countries that fail to investigate claims of sexual
exploitation or abuse committed by their
peacekeepers could be a model.73 A policy along
these lines could ensure that troop-contributing
countries take standards and protocols seriously
and adequately equip and train their personnel for
providing medical support.
OTHER CHALLENGES
Political Challenges and Host-State
Consent
One of the foundational principles of peacekeeping
is the need for host-state consent. There have been
cases where host states have asked missions to leave
(e.g., the UN Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad) and where host states have
made it very difficult for missions to function (e.g.,
the UN-AU Mission in Darfur). After six months,
the new UN Mission in Colombia still has no
agreement with the government on using its
medical resources for UN staff, meaning it has been
working without any form of medical cover for
those deployed. This has partly been attributed to
questions over who is and who should be in charge
of seeking this consent, and when they should seek
it.74
Another recent challenge has been lack of host-
state consent for use of airspace, which can prevent
proper MedEvac and CasEvac. In South Sudan, for
example, UNMISS has had difficulty getting the
government to sign a memorandum of
understanding permitting MedEvac and CasEvac.
Healthcare Waste Management
The proper management of medical waste is a
major challenge faced by UN missions and troop-
and police-contributing countries. Medical waste
(e.g., expired medical products, pharmaceuticals,
medicines, sharp products, infected wastes) is
hazardous. If improperly released into the environ-
ment, it can cause pollution, disease, and other
serious harm. The current management of medical
waste needs to be improved in order to meet
environmental standards. There have been cases
where expired medicines are buried in holes in the
ground, medical waste materials are disposed of as
non-hazardous solid waste, and incinerators are
not burning at a temperature high enough to safely
destroy hazardous substances or lack air filters to
prevent toxic emissions.75
This is highlighted as a major area of concern in
both the Environmental Policy and the Waste
Management Policy for UN field missions.
However, the UN manual on contingent-owned
equipment does not specify how medical waste
should be disposed of. While many medical units
already deploy with incinerators, making an
incinerator a standard piece of equipment for all
medical units deployed to UN missions could help
make medical waste management more secure and
environmentally compliant.76
Responding to Epidemics
In addition to the rise in hostile acts against UN
peacekeepers, the cholera epidemic in Haiti and
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Ebola epidemic in West Africa highlighted the need
for flexible and responsive missions. The outbreak
of cholera in Haiti in 2012 has been linked back to
Nepalese troops in the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH). The UN response to the crisis
was inadequate, and the fact that the mission failed
so notably in its safety and environmental protec-
tion standards highlighted a serious challenge in
terms of mission planning, waste management, and
medical care. The outbreak also complicated the
mission’s mandate, which did not include
responding to the outbreak.77
As in Haiti, the initial response of the UN to the
Ebola outbreak in West Africa was inadequate. In
Liberia, the UN already had potential resources on
the ground in the form of the UN Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL), and this mission may have been
able to do more within the terms of its mandate.78
Ultimately, the UN responded to the crisis by
deploying its first-ever emergency health mission,
the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
(UNMEER). This mission is an important case
study of how the UN, with member-state support,
can provide a whole-of-system response through
coordination, partnership, and creative use of
existing tools. It highlighted how the UN can better
respond to multidimensional crises by, among
other things, giving missions flexible mandates,
providing flexible and predictable funding for
rapidly scaling up responses, putting in place a
system-wide communications strategy, and
engaging in high-level of coordination.79
UN personnel being deployed to an area affected
by an outbreak, particularly medical personnel,
should receive adequate training before arrival. For
medical personnel, this should include specialized
training in healthcare protocols, while other
personnel deployed to the mission should receive
prevention and awareness training. For those
already in the mission, including national
personnel, special training should be provided as
early as possible to ensure that all personnel, partic-
ularly those with medical functions, know how to
minimize their exposure.
During outbreaks of infectious diseases, the UN
needs to consider medical evacuation as a preven-
tive measure. Further, when UN personnel fall ill,
the mission has a duty to ensure they have access to
appropriate medical care, irrespective of nation-
ality. Where a highly infectious disease is present,
the mission should have triage and patient-holding
facilities to minimize contact while providing an
appropriate standard of medical care. Rapid-testing




The preamble of the UN Charter states, “We the
peoples of the United Nations determined to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small.”81 This sentiment applies not only
to civilians the UN aims to protect but also to the
personnel it deploys to the field. Given the rise of
violent extremism and complex attacks targeting
peacekeepers in some missions, the UN faces a
more challenging job in protecting those it deploys.
As this paper has shown, existing medical plans
and procedures are not meeting the needs of those
on the ground and need to be adapted to high-risk
missions. The following recommendations are
intended to enhance the efficiency and effective-
ness of medical support to UN peace operations in
high-risk environments.
RESTRUCTURE MEDICAL SUPPORT IN
UN HEADQUARTERS
Although at least in theory there is clarity on the
roles and responsibilities of the Medical Services
Division (MSD) and Medical Support Section
(MSS), too often mission planners are not clear on
whom to liaise with within these units. To address
this, MSD and MSS need to coordinate better and
77  Arthur Boutellis, “Cholera, Haiti and MINUSTAH: What Implications for Peacekeeping,” International Peace Institute, January 11, 2011, available at
www.ipinst.org/2011/01/cholera-haiti-and-minustah-what-implications-for-peacekeeping .
78  Sara E. Davies and Simon Rushton, “Public Health Emergencies: A New Peacekeeping Mission? Insights from UNMIL’s Role in the Liberia Ebola Outbreak,”
Third World Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2016).
79  Adam Lupel and Michael Snyder, “The Mission to Stop Ebola: Lessons for UN Crisis Response,” International Peace Institute, February 15, 2017, available at
www.ipinst.org/2017/02/un-crisis-response-ebola .
80  Interview with Karin Landgren, 2016.
81  United Nations, Charter, Preamble, 1945.
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to create links with the Office of Military Affairs.
• MSS and MSD should co-locate to permit better
coordination.
• MSS should have more permanent staff and rely
less on seconded officers.
INCREASE THE IMPORTANCE OF
MEDICAL SUPPORT PLANNING
There is no one-size-fits-all model for medical
support. With more peace operations deploying to
high-risk environments, there is a need to ensure
that medical aspects of mission planning are taken
seriously during the planning process.
• Medical support planning should be included in
every aspect of mission planning.
• Medical support planning should be tailored to
the context and be flexible to respond to
emergency situations, whether related to health
or to hostilities.
• In high-risk environments, the status of MSD in
planning processes should be elevated to ensure
that the medical support model is adequate.
• A full-time officer with medical planning
expertise should be seconded to the Office of
Military Affairs to work closely with MSD and
MSS in each mission.82
REVISIT THE USE OF LEVEL II
HOSPITALS
The cost of Level II hospitals is very high and their
utility quite low. Except in the case of mass-
casualty events, these hospitals usually sit empty.
Even when they are used, it is generally to stabilize
patients until they can be evacuated to a Level III
hospital or to their home country. The notion of
Level II hospitals is better-suited to the large-scale
battles of World Wars I and II than to the realities
of modern peace operations.
• Mobile medical units with surgical capabilities
(Level I+) could be used in place of Level II
hospitals.
• Contributing countries could adopt a rotational
scheme for medical support, whereby medical
units would be shared by a group of countries
that join together to provide the resources to
construct the hospital and rotate personnel.
• Contributing countries could put in place more
multinational medical arrangements, such as
where one country deploys a hospital and
another a doctor, or where many countries work
together in one location.
These changes could incentivize smaller
countries to work together in providing high-




Although contributing countries are responsible
for providing pre-deployment first-aid training,
and this is supposed to be verified, this is not
always the case. As a result, there is a need to focus
on in-mission training, including through capacity
building of key personnel involved in medical
support. A valuable component of capacity
building is mentoring, which can help build and
strengthen partnerships between the UN and local
communities and among peacekeeping contin-
gents.
• The Integrated Training Service (ITS), as the
body within the UN responsible for developing
training modules, should work with MSD and
MSS to develop and institute standardized pre-
deployment training to be conducted by
contributing countries. This should include
training in first aid and pre-hospital trauma life
support for all UN personnel deployed to
missions.
• In order to monitor adherence to training
standards, ITS, in consultation with MSD and
MSS, should develop a standardized skills test to
evaluate pre-deployment trainings by
contributing countries.
• ITS, in collaboration with MSD and MSS, should
set up a training-of-trainers center in Entebbe,
Uganda, and increase the number of mobile
training teams.
• MSD should use the training center and training
teams to commission pre-deployment training of
medical personnel to ensure they have standard-
ized and up-to-date trauma-response skills.
• MSD should consider developing a medical
certification to ensure all doctors deployed to
missions have the same standard of qualification.
82  Currently there is a seconded officer to MSD with both military and medical experience.
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• Contributing countries should consider
deploying multinational hospitals where they
work together and train each other.
• UN-deployed hospitals should engage in
humanitarian outreach by providing medical
services to local populations to ensure they are
fully utilized while on rotation. This should be
done in partnership with local communities.
ALIGN UN CASEVAC AND MEDEVAC
PROCEDURES WITH BEST PRACTICES
Simplification, decentralization, and flexibility are
needed to shorten the chain of command for
MedEvac and CasEvac in high-risk environments.
• MSD and troop-contributing countries should
develop a set of criteria for when authority to
deploy air assets for CasEvac or MedEvac can be
transferred to the force commander. These
criteria should be based on the level of risk and
types of injuries.
• Joint Operations Centres should be empowered
to facilitate integration, improve situational
awareness, and make decisions during CasEvac
and MedEvac. A patient evacuation coordination
cell could also be imbedded in the Joint
Operations Centre.
• The working group on medical support reform
(MSD, MSS, and the Office of Military Affairs)
should evaluate NATO, the EU, and other
multinational organizations’ CasEvac and
MedEvac doctrine and procedural guidance for
best practices and preferred tactics, techniques,
and procedures to consider how these could be
implemented in UN missions.
• UN missions should put in place dedicated
CaseEvac and MedEvac resources, specifically
helicopters, for the most high-risk areas and
operations.
GENERATE RESOURCES AND FORCES
IN A TARGETED WAY
To address critical gaps in the ability of high-risk
UN peace operations to ensure the safety and
security of their personnel, the UN should seek
pledges from member states in a targeted way.
• The UN Strategic Force Generation and
Capability Planning Cell should target countries
to pledge specific medical resources to missions
in order to meet the needs of high-risk environ-
ments.
• Reimbursements should be used to penalize
countries that deploy substandard medical
equipment or personnel without adequate pre-
deployment medical training.
• The UN Strategic Force Generation and
Capability Planning Cell should be more
selective in what resources it accepts in peace
operations and logically place resources within
missions. This should include ensuring that
medical personnel speak, and medications have
instructions in, the languages spoken in the
missions to which they are deployed.
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